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Abstract
Background: The children of teen mothers have been reported to have higher rates of several
unfavorable mental health outcomes. Past research suggests several possible mechanisms for an
association between religiosity and teen birth rate in communities.
Methods:  The present study compiled publicly accessible data on birth rates, conservative
religious beliefs, income, and abortion rates in the U.S., aggregated at the state level. Data on teen
birth rates and abortion originated from the Center for Disease Control; on income, from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census, and on religious beliefs, from the U.S. Religious Landscape Survey carried
out by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. We computed correlations and partial
correlations.
Results: Increased religiosity in residents of states in the U.S. strongly predicted a higher teen birth
rate, with r = 0.73 (p < 0.0005). Religiosity correlated negatively with median household income,
with r = -0.66, and income correlated negatively with teen birth rate, with r = -0.63. But the
correlation between religiosity and teen birth rate remained highly significant when income was
controlled for via partial correlation: the partial correlation between religiosity and teen birth rate,
controlling for income, was 0.53 (p < 0.0005). Abortion rate correlated negatively with religiosity,
with r = -0.45, p = 0.002. However, the partial correlation between teen birth rate and religiosity
remained high and significant when controlling for abortion rate (partial correlation = 0.68, p <
0.0005) and when controlling for both abortion rate and income (partial correlation = 0.54, p =
0.001).
Conclusion: With data aggregated at the state level, conservative religious beliefs strongly predict
U.S. teen birth rates, in a relationship that does not appear to be the result of confounding by
income or abortion rates. One possible explanation for this relationship is that teens in more
religious communities may be less likely to use contraception.
Background
The children of teen mothers in the U.S., on the average,
have worse outcomes in a number of ways. They score
lower in school achievement tests, have a greater likeli-
hood of repeating a grade, are rated more unfavorably by
teachers while in high school, have worse physical health,
are more likely to be indicated victims of abuse and
neglect, have higher durations of foster care placement,
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and are almost three times more likely to be incarcerated
during adolescence or the early 20 s than the children of
mothers who delayed childbearing; the daughters of teen
mothers are more likely to become teen mothers them-
selves[1].
In the United States, what to teach adolescents about sex-
uality and the prevention of teen pregnancy has been con-
troversial. A number of sex education programs in the U.S.
have been mandated to be "abstinence-only" programs,
excluding the teaching of contraceptive techniques. As
stated in a National Public Radio poll report, "the histor-
ical impetus for abstinence education has come from
evangelical or born-again Christians.... Eighty-one percent
of evangelical or born-again Christians believe it is mor-
ally wrong for unmarried adults to engage in sexual inter-
course, compared with 33 percent of other
Americans....More than twice as many evangelicals as
non-evangelicals (49 percent to 21 percent) believe the
government should fund abstinence-only programs
instead of using the money for more comprehensive sex
education [2]."
Other polls have presented varying results on similar
questions: A 2008 poll in Minnesota [3] reported that a
significantly smaller fraction of those who described
themselves as "very conservative" politically and those
who were "born again" Christian supported comprehen-
sive sex education than the corresponding fractions of
more liberal and non-born-again; however, in this sam-
ple, 83.2% of the born-again Christians supported com-
prehensive sex education; only 51% of the politically
"very conservative" supported it.
The connection between religion and attitudes toward
contraception prompts investigation of the relationship
between religiosity and teen pregnancy.
Some studies have suggested that greater religiosity is
associated with either greater abstinence or lower teen
birth rate. Hardy and Raffaelli, who analyzed data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, reported that
higher time one religiosity predicted a lower likelihood of
first sexual intercourse between time one and time two
[4]. Loury concluded that communities with larger com-
munities of Catholics and Conservative Protestants have
lower rates of teen childbearing, all other things equal [5].
This conclusion was drawn from an analysis of women
from age 14-20 in 1979, taken from the National Longitu-
dinal Study of Youth. McCree and colleagues found that
African-American females with higher religiosity scores
were more likely to have initiated sex at a later age, to have
used a condom in the last six months, and to possess more
positive attitudes toward condom use [6]. Rostosky et al.
found that adolescent religiosity predicted later coital
debut [7]. However, there was a significant interaction
between race and religiosity: African-American adolescent
males who were either more religious or had signed a vir-
ginity pledge were more likely to debut than African-
American males who were less religious and/or who had
not signed a pledge. Miller and Gur found, upon analyz-
ing the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health
in the U.S., that frequent attendance of religious events in
girls 12 to 21 years old was positively associated with a
"responsible and planned use of birth control" [8]. Per-
sonal conservatism, however, was associated with unpro-
tected sex. Manlove and colleagues, upon analysis of the
1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, found that
in the sample as a whole, greater family religiosity was
associated with "using contraceptives consistently"; how-
ever, among sexually active males, family religiosity was
"directly and negatively associated with contraceptive
consistency" [9].
Other studies have suggested that religiosity is associated
with behaviors that could lead to a higher teen birth rate.
Studer and Thornton found that among 18 year-olds, reli-
gious teenagers were less likely to use medical methods of
contraception when sexually active [10]. Dodge and col-
leagues compared male college students in the United
States and the Netherlands [11]. American men reported
higher rates of inadequate contraception and unwanted
pregnancy than their Dutch counterparts; religiosity and
sex education were thought to explain these differences.
Rosenbaum compared adolescents who reported taking a
virginity pledge with a matched sample of nonpledgers
[12]. Among the matching variables was pre-pledge relig-
iosity and attitudes toward sex and birth control. Pledgers
did not differ from nonpledgers in lifetime sexual partners
and age of first sex, but pledgers were less likely to have
used birth control and condoms in the past year and at
last sex. This research raises the possibility that moralistic
attitudes toward sexuality can actually increase the likeli-
hood of pregnancy, by discouraging contraception with-
out successfully discouraging sexual intercourse.
Such a hypothesis is bolstered by the research of Santelli
and colleagues, who calculated that 86% of the decline in
adolescent pregnancies that occurred between 1995 and
2002 was attributable to improved contraceptive use [13].
Santelli and colleagues cite the example of the Nether-
lands, which in the 1970's went through a period of soul
searching and consensus-building about the need for con-
traception and prevention of sexually transmitted infec-
tions in adolescents, and today has one of the lowest teen
birth rates in the world[14]. If contraception is more effec-
tive than attempted abstinence in reducing birth rates,
then attempts to discourage both contraception and sex-Reproductive Health 2009, 6:14 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/6/1/14
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ual intercourse among teenagers could raise teen birth
rates.
A complicating variable related to teen births and religios-
ity is the rate of abortions among teens. Adamczyk and
Felson, after analyzing longitudinal survey data from the
U.S., reported that more highly religious women are less
likely to have either an abortion or an out of wedlock
pregnancy [15]. Tomal, upon analyzing data from 1024
counties in 18 U.S. states, found that religious member-
ship level was negatively related to teen abortion rates
[16].
Cahn and Carbone summarized differences in attitudes
about family and sexuality between the more religious
and conservative U.S. "red families," versus the less reli-
gious and more liberal "blue families" [17]. These authors
observed: "Within red families, abstinence outside of mar-
riage is a moral imperative, the shotgun marriage is the
preferred solution to an improvident pregnancy, and
socialization into traditional gender roles is critical to
marital stability." The blue model, however, "involves less
control of sexuality, celebrates more egalitarian gender
roles, and promotes financial independence and emo-
tional maturity as the sine qua non of responsible parent-
hood In this new model, abstinence is unrealistic,
contraception is not only permissible, but morally com-
pelled, and abortion is the necessary (and responsible)
fallback." (p. 3). Cahn and Carbone mention that teen
birth rates appear higher among "red" families.
The present study approaches the relationship between
teen birth rate and religiosity by looking at data aggre-
gated across states in the United States.
Methods
Data Sources
This study compiled data from publicly accessible data
sets. The data on religiosity were from the U.S. Religious
Landscapes Survey, published by the Pew Forum on Reli-
gion and Public Life in 2008 [18]. The Pew survey was
conducted in 2007, with additional subjects added in
2008; it employed telephone survey methodology with a
sample of 35,957 participants. We used the results of eight
questions from the survey, the responses to which were
broken down by state. We transcribed the percent of
respondents who endorsed the most conservative reli-
gious answer to each of the eight questions. Specifically,
we entered the percentages of respondents for each state
who endorsed each of the following statements:
1) Belief in a God or universal spirit: Absolutely Certain.
2) There is only one way to interpret the teachings of my
religion.
3) Scripture should be taken literally, word for word.
4) How important is religion in your life: Very Important.
5) My religion is the one true faith leading to eternal life.
6) Frequency of attendance at religious services: at least
once a week.
7) Frequency of prayer: at least once a day.
8) How often do you receive a definite answer to a specific
prayer request: at least once a month.
In the tables published in the Religious Landscapes Sur-
vey, the percents reported were aggregated across three
pairs of states and across Maryland and the District of
Columbia, because the sample size from at least one
member those pairs was fairly small. We obtained from
the Pew Forum staff the disaggregated data and used those
numbers in our data set. The sample sizes were deemed
too small in Wyoming and the District of Columbia for
Pew Forum to release them, and thus these data points are
missing. For Rhode Island, data were missing on two of
the eight questions; we imputed these missing data points
by means of regression on the remaining six questions, so
that Rhode Island could be included in the data set.
In order to obtain one composite religiosity score for each
state, we averaged the percents of respondents endorsing
the most religious answer across the eight questions.
The rates of teen birth in the fifty U.S. states plus the Dis-
trict of Columbia were reported by the National Center for
Health Statistics at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention [19]. The data reported were for 2006 births,
the latest available (and thus the closest possible in time
to the date of the collection of the religiosity data set).
A possible confounding variable in the relationship
between teen birthrate and religiosity is household
income level. We obtained data on the median household
income by state in the U.S. from data published by the
U.S. Census Bureau [20]. The median two year average
household income for 2006-2007 for each state was
entered into our database.
To account for another factor which could complicate the
analysis of teen birthrate and religiosity, we estimated the
abortion rate among teenagers for each state. The most
recent data available on abortion rates were from 2005,
published by the Center for Disease Control [21]. These
rates were broken down by the states of residence of the
women receiving the abortions. In order to estimate rates
for abortions delivered to teens only, we multiplied theReproductive Health 2009, 6:14 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/6/1/14
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overall rates by the fraction of abortions delivered to teens
for 2005, as published in the same Centers for Disease
Control report; these were categorized by the state in
which the abortion was delivered. Data were available for
46 states; the District of Columbia. California, Florida,
Louisiana and New Hampshire were missing from this
data set. The product of the abortion rate and the fraction
of abortions delivered to teens yielded an estimated rate
of abortions per 1000 teenaged females.
The CDC obtains its abortion rates by surveying the Cen-
tral Health Departments of the various regions. A different
approach is used by the Guttmacher Institute, which sur-
veys providers of abortions. We used the Guttmacher data
for 2005 to cross check abortion rates [22].
Data Analyses
We examined the intercorrelations among the individual
religiosity questions to determine whether these were
high enough to form an index score. We then formed an
index score by averaging the eight religiosity items.
We examined the relationships of the variables with Pear-
son correlations and partial correlations, as computed by
SPSS [23]. The partial correlation between a first and sec-
ond variable, controlling for the third, is identical to the
Pearson correlation between the residuals obtained when
each of the first two is regressed upon the third - in other
words, when the effect of the third variable is "removed"
from each of the first two [24]. We computed 95% confi-
dence intervals for the most important correlations and
partial correlations, using the Fisher r-to-z transformation.
The variance of the Fisher-transformed correlation is 1/(n-
3) for bivariate correlations, and 1/(n-k-2) for partial cor-
relations, where k is the total number of independent var-
iables (e.g. k = 2 for a partial correlation with one variable
controlled; k = 3 for two variables controlled) [24].
Results
The justification for forming an index from the Pew 
religion items
We examined the 28 intercorrelations among the eight
different religiosity variables reported in the Pew Survey.
The minimum intercorrelation was 0.55, and the maxi-
mum was 0.96. The average intercorrelation was 0.81.
Thus the intercorrelation of the religiosity items are high
enough to justify making an index score by averaging the
scores across the eight items.
The correlation between teen birth rate and religiosity
For all the correlational analyses reported below, we
examined the plots of residuals for the regressions with
the same independent variables and with teen birth as the
dependent variable. There was a slight trend toward
increasing residuals with increasing values of the depend-
ent variable; in our opinion this trend was not enough to
invalidate the linear model, in view of the high correla-
tions obtained and the linear appearance of scatter plots.
Teen birth rate correlated with our composite religiosity
variable with r = 0.73; 95% CI (0.56,0.84); n = 49; p <
0.0005. Thus teen birth rate is very highly correlated with
religiosity at the state level, with more religious states hav-
ing a higher rate of teen birth. A scatter plot of teen birth
rate as a function of religiosity is presented in Figure 1.
Controlling for income and abortion rate
Next we considered whether median family income for
states could be a confounding variable. Income negatively
correlated with teen birth rate, with r = -0.63, n = 51, p <
0.0005. Furthermore, income correlated negatively with
religiosity, with r = -0.66, n = 49; p < 0.0005. Thus the
direction and magnitude of correlations made income a
primary candidate for a confounding variable. However,
the partial correlation of teen birth rate with religion
while controlling for income was 0.53; 95% CI (0.29,
0.71); df = 46; p < 0.0005. Thus the correlation between
religion and teen birth remained large and highly signifi-
cant, even when controlling for income. The raw religios-
ity scores and teen birth scores shared a little over half
their variance (R2 = 0.53) whereas these variables with
income removed by partialing shared a little over a quar-
ter of their variance (R2 = 0.28).
The correlation between teen abortion rate and religiosity
was -0.45; n = 45; p = 0.002. Thus the teen abortion rate
was lower in states that were more religious. Furthermore,
teen abortion rate was negatively correlated with teen
birth rate, with r = -0.26, although this relationship failed
significance at the 0.05 level (n = 47, p = 0.078). Would
including abortion rate as a covariate greatly affect the cor-
relation between teen birth and religiosity? The answer
turned out to be no. The partial correlation between teen
birth rate and religiosity, controlling for abortion rate, was
0.68; 95% CI (0.48, 0.81); df = 42; p < 0.0005. The partial
correlation between teen birth and religiosity, controlling
for both income and abortion rate, was 0.54; 95% CI
(0.29, 0.72); df = 41; p < 0.0005. Thus, even after taking
into account the abortion rate and controlling for income,
the correlation between religiosity and teen pregnancy
remained high and significant.
Table 1 presents a summary of the four correlations that
summarize our findings on the relationship between teen
birth and religiosity.
Checks for Robustness
When averaging the results of the eight items of the relig-
iosity survey, one approach would be to first compute the
z-scores for each item, and then average the z-scores. SuchReproductive Health 2009, 6:14 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/6/1/14
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an approach would assign the same standard deviation to
each item, so that items with higher standard deviations
did not count more heavily toward the average score.
When we checked this "average of standardized religiosity
scores," its correlation with the average of the raw percents
was 0.999 (n = 49, p < 0.0005). This result implies that the
two measures are interchangeable, and that differences in
standard deviations among the eight items do not appre-
ciably influence the distribution of the average religiosity
score. We used the raw percents rather than the standard-
ized scores so that the scatterplot would be more intui-
tively interpretable.
Was there something about the averaging process itself
that hid important information or inflated the correla-
tion? To check this, we computed the individual correla-
tion with teen birth rate for each of the eight religiosity
items. The results are presented in Table 2.
Averaging of items probably results in a higher reliability,
which would be expected to improve the correlation with
teen birth; the higher reliability of the average than of the
individual items is predicted by the Spearman-Brown for-
mula [25]. However, each of the items separately reveals a
reasonably high correlation with teen birth rate.
Scatterplot of Teen Birth Rate by Religiosity Score Figure 1
Scatterplot of Teen Birth Rate by Religiosity Score.
Table 1: Correlation or Partial Correlation of Teen Birth Rate with Religiosity with Various Variables Controlled
Variable(s) Controlled None Income Abortion Income and Abortion
Correlation or Partial Correlation 0.73 0.53 0.68 0.54Reproductive Health 2009, 6:14 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/6/1/14
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We used as the measure of religiosity the percent of
respondents replying in the most religious way; how
would the conclusion have been affected if we had
entered the percent replying in the least religious way?
Some of the questions were dichotomies, and thus the
correlations for those items would have had the same
magnitude with opposite sign. To check a couple of the
items that were not dichotomies, we entered the percent-
ages for the least religious response to literal interpreta-
tion of scripture and frequency of prayer, and found
correlations of -0.91 and -0.90, respectively, between per-
cent most religious and percent least religious. The corre-
lations of teen birth with "irreligiosity" were very similar
in absolute value to the correlations with religiosity for
those items. The percent who prayed "seldom or never" in
the states correlated at -0.67 with teen birth; the percent
who felt that scripture was a "book written by men, not
the word of God" correlated at -0.63 with teen birth. It
appears that alternate scoring mechanisms measuring
irreligiosity would yield the same conclusions and would
add nothing to our results.
The Guttmacher Institute gathers data on abortion rates
by contacting providers of abortions rather than central
health agencies. We entered into our data set the Gutt-
macher abortion rate for women 15-44 for 2005; the cor-
relation of Guttmacher abortion rate (all women) with
CDC rate is 0.66 (n = 47, p < 0.005). Using the Gutt-
macher abortion rate rather than the CDC rate in our par-
tial correlations made no substantive changes - for
example, the partial correlation of teen birth with religios-
ity controlling for CDC estimated teen abortion rates was
0.68; the partial correlation controlling for Guttmacher
estimated teen abortion rates (obtained by multiplying
overall Guttmacher abortion rates by the fraction of abor-
tions obtained by teens according to CDC data) was 0.65.
The variation among the fraction of teen abortion rates in
different states was small enough that it made little differ-
ence for the partial correlations whether we used esti-
mated teen abortion rates or the overall abortion rates for
women in the state. The partial correlation of teen birth
with religiosity, partialling out CDC abortion rates for all
women was 0.69; the same partial correlation using over-
all rates reported by Guttmacher was 0.70. Estimated teen
abortions correlated with overall abortions for the state
with r = 0.97 for CDC rates and r = 0.99 for Guttmacher
rates.
To what extent is the main finding reported here, i.e. the
correlation between teen birth and religiosity, dependent
upon any one state? Inspection of the scatterplot reveals
no major outliers; two influential points appear to be
those for Mississippi and Utah. Mississippi, as the state
both highest in religiosity and teen birth, tends to increase
the correlation; however if the correlation is recomputed
without Mississippi, the correlation remains in the same
region, with r = 0.69. Utah, which is high in religiosity but
in the mid range for teen birth, tends to decrease the cor-
relation; with Utah (but not Mississippi) eliminated the
correlation between teen birth rate and religiosity would
have been 0.76. For Rhode Island, we used imputation to
estimate the two out of eight items that were missing; had
we simply made Rhode Island a missing data point, the
correlation between teen birth and religiosity would have
been 0.72. Thus the magnitude of the correlation we
report appears not to be greatly altered by the elimination
of any one state.
Discussion
At the state level in the U.S., religiosity, as operationally
defined by the eight questions of the Pew Survey, accu-
rately predicts a high teen birth rate. The significant and
high correlation continues to hold after statistically con-
trolling for income and abortion rate.
It is a statistical maxim that higher correlations are to be
found using aggregated data, for example state averages,
than with individual level data. This is because some of
the noise at the individual level is cancelled by the aggre-
gation process, allowing the relationship between signals
to be more clear. As stated in an introductory statistics
text, "Correlations based on averages are usually too high
when applied to individuals[26]." Nonetheless, the mag-
nitude of the correlation between religiosity and teen
birth rate astonished us. Teen birth is more highly corre-
lated with some of the religiosity items than some of those
items are correlated with each other. We would like to
emphasize that we are not attempting to use associations
between teen birth rate and religiosity, using data aggre-
gated at the state level, to make inferences at the individ-
ual level. It would be a statistical and logical error to infer
from our results, "Religious teens get pregnant more
often." Such an inference would be an example of the eco-
logical fallacy, which was explicated by Robinson in 1950
[27] and reviewed by Freedman in 2001 [28]. The associ-
ations we report could still be obtained if, hypothetically,
Table 2: Correlations of Teen Birth Rate with Individual Religiosity Items
Item Belief God One Interp. Literal 
Scripture
Import. For 
Life
One True 
Faith
Attend 
Services
Frequent 
Prayer
Prayers 
Answered
Correlation 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.70 0.56 0.53 0.71 0.74Reproductive Health 2009, 6:14 http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/6/1/14
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religiosity in communities had an effect of discouraging
contraceptive use in the whole community, including the
nonreligious teens there, and only the nonreligious teens
became pregnant. Or, to create a different imaginary sce-
nario, the results could be obtained if religious parents
discouraged contraceptive use in their children, but only
nonreligious offspring of such religious parents got preg-
nant. We create these scenarios simply to illustrate that
our ecological correlations do not permit statements
about individuals.
We should also caution that on an individual level, certain
teen pregnancies are often highly desirable, and some teen
parents carry out their responsibilities exceptionally well.
If it were possible to obtain good data on unplanned teen
pregnancy or pregnancy by "immature" teen parents, we
would use it, but we did not find such data available.
Nonetheless, at the aggregate level, it is probably true that
public policies or cultural practices that reduce the overall
rate of teen births are, other things equal, desirable.
Our findings by themselves, of course, do not permit
causal inferences. There could be unstudied confounding
variables that account for the correlations we report. But if
we may speculate on the most probable explanation,
drawing on the other research cited above: we conjecture
that conservative religious communities in the U.S. are
more successful in discouraging use of contraception
among their teen community members than in discourag-
ing sexual intercourse itself.
Conclusion
At the level of states in the U.S., conservative religious
beliefs predict teen birth rates highly and significantly; the
correlation remains high and significant after controlling
for income and estimated rates of abortion.
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